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Participants’ competitiveness and bidding behavior in experimental auctions: an 
application to the Spanish market 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of the paper was to examine if experimental auctions are demand revealing 
regardless the level of participants’ competitiveness. Then, we design an experimental 
auction with two treatments to check if the level of participants’ competitiveness does 
affect their bidding behavior. Both treatments had all the same designed characteristics 
except that in the second treatment, participants who reported the highest levels of 
competitiveness were not allow to participate in the auction. Then, we could directly 
compare bids from both treatments to test differences in bidding behavior between them. 
Our findings generally indicate that the level of participants’ competitiveness does not 
affect bidding behavior and then, homegrown experimental auctions are demand revealing 
in practice regardless the level of participants’ competitiveness.  
Keywords: demand revelation, lamb meat, Spain, Ojinegra from Teruel  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the use of non-hypothetical experimental methods such as experimental 
auctions, where participants make consequential bids with real products and real money, 
has become very popular in assessing consumers’ preferences for product attributes or new 
products. Well over 100 studies were published in the academic literature using 
experimental auctions in a wide range of applications valuing such diverse goods as food, 
cars, coffee mugs, sports cards, and lotteries (Corrigan et al., 2011). One of the major 
reasons for the increasing popularity of experimental auctions is their theoretical economic 
incentive compatibility property assuring that participants have the dominant strategy to 
submit bids equal to their true value for the good. Then, to get true valuations from 
homegrown experimental auctions participants should be explicitly told about their weakly 
dominant strategy and provide with reasoning as to why they should follow it when bidding 
(Lusk and Shrogren, 2007). In other words, if participants before implementation of the 
auction are instructed that it is in their best interest to offer a bid equal to their true values, 
the experimental auction would be demand revealing in practice and therefore, participants 
will provide truthful biddings (as proved by Corrigan and Rousu (2008)). However, 
different factors can affect participants bidding behavior which might compromised the 
demand revealing properties of a theoretical economic incentive compatible auction even if 
participants are trained about the economic incentive compatibility issue. As Lusk and 
Shrogren (2007) pointed out some participants’ personally traits may affect bidding 
behavior in experimental auctions and one personality trait of direct relevance for 
experimental auctions relates to the competitiveness of a person. It is reasonable to think 
that if participants have higher level of competitiveness, they would offer higher bids 
because their get additional utility from winning the auction. Then, the aim of our paper is 
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to analyze if the level of participants’ competitiveness does affect their bidding behavior. In 
particular, we tested if there is a statistically significant difference between bids elicited by 
participants with two different levels of competitiveness (higher competitiveness and lower 
competitiveness).    
 To do that, we conducted an experimental auction with two treatments. In both 
treatments, participants, before the implementation of the auction, were asked about their 
level of competitiveness but in the second treatment those participants with the highest 
levels of competitiveness were not allow to participate in the auction. This manipulation 
aimed to diminish, ceteris paribus, the level of participants’ competitiveness in the sessions 
including only those participants who stated lower level of competitiveness. Then, we will 
be able to test our hypothesis by comparing the elicited bids from the two treatments.   
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the next section discusses the 
experimental design; the section following this presents the results and the final section 
provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Experimental design 
 
2.1. General design and hypothesis testing 
To test our research hypothesis, we conducted an experimental auction for four lamb meat 
products with two treatments. We designed the two treatments as homogenous as possible 
with the only difference that in the second treatment, after asking participants about their 
level of competitiveness, those who reported the highest levels of competitiveness were not 
allow to participate in the auction. We then kept the rest of design characteristics similar 
between treatments including recruitment of subjects. Moreover, as lies can affect behavior 
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in experiments (Alfnes and Rickersten, 2011), we did not deceive participants because we 
provided true information about the auctioned products and we used real products, in other 
words, the products auctioned during the experiment posed the characteristics explained to 
participants. The experiments were conducted in the region of Aragón (Spain), in the town 
of Zaragoza and all participants were consumers, instead of students, and claimed to eat 
lamb meat at least occasionally to ensure that participants were familiar with the auctioned 
product as suggested by Alfnes and Rickersten (2011). Each participant attended only one 
of the two treatments, in other words, we designed a within experiment following Lusk and 
Schroeder (2004). 
To test if participants’ level of competitiveness does affect their bidding behavior, 
our hypothesis of interest is whether there is a statistically significant difference between 
bids elicited from treatment 1 (control treatment C) and treatment 2 (lower competitiveness 
treatment, LC), where the most competitive subjects were not allow to participate in the 
auction, depicted as: 
     
 H0: BidsC = BidsLC    H1: BidsC ≠ BidsLC     (1) 
 
If we fail to reject this hypothesis, then we may conclude that Bids from both 
treatments are statistically equal and therefore, the level of participants’ competitiveness 
does not affect participants bidding behaviour in the auction.   
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2.2. Experimental auction design 
We used a simultaneous (i.e., full bidding) experimental auction1 for four locally produced 
lamb meats2 and asked subjects to simultaneously submit bids for each of the products. To 
avoid demand reduction effects, participants were told that they could only purchase one 
package of lamb meat. Therefore, a product was randomly drawn as the binding product at 
the end of the auction.  
Among the different incentive compatible auction mechanisms, we used a 4th price 
auction because it provides more winners than a typical Vickrey second-price auction. The 
second-price auction method will only produce one winner per session and this situation 
could disengage some of the participants (e.g., off-margin bidders)3. Moreover, several 
papers in the past have also utilized the 4th price auction (e.g., Alfnes et al., 2008; Shaw et 
al., 2006; Muller and Ruffieux, 2011). We conducted five rounds in each session and the 
price and identification number of the four highest bidders for each product was written on 
a whiteboard after each round4. At the end of the session one of the rounds was randomly 
selected as the binding round.  
                                                 
1 Alfnes (2009) indicated that the simultaneous auction approach seems to be the best choice when valuing products’ 
quality attributes. 
2 We auctioned four packages of three lamb ribs: i) unlabelled non-suckling lamb meat; ii) unlabelled suckling lamb meat; 
iii) labeled non-suckling lamb meat; and iv) labelled suckling lamb meat. Lamb ribs were chosen because they are well-
known and appreciated cuts in the Zaragoza market. The label was a sheep breed locally produced called “Ojinegra from 
Teruel”.   
3 Lusk et al. (2007) found that if the number of participants who could purchase the product is approximately half the 
session size (N) (i.e., either a fourth of fifth price for commonly used session sizes), that this auction mechanism would 
generally be more effective in engaging all bidders (low, medium and high value bidders). 
4 The use of multiple rounds with price feedback (posted prices) was first applied in experimental auctions because 
as Plott (1996) suggested, people’s preferences are learned through experience and market exposure. Hence, price 
feedback in multiple rounds was used as a mechanism for subjects to learn the auction market. However, some researchers 
have cautioned that repeated exposure of subjects to market price might cause their bids to become affiliated, which could 
cause the incentive compatibility property of the auction mechanism to break down (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Harrison 
et al., 2004; Harrison, 2006; Corrigan and Rousu, 2006) and were in favor of one-shot institutions. On the other hand, 
there is another group of researchers who is supportive of the use of multiple rounds, arguing that this procedure yields 
valuations more consistent with neoclassical economic theory (Cox and Grether, 1996; Shogren et al., 2001; Alfnes and 
Rickersen, 2003; Lusk and Shogren, 2007; Shogren, 2006; Corrigan et al., 2011). Given that this issue is still unsettled in 
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2.3. Description of the auction implementation 
After arrival of the participants, they were informed that they would receive 10 € 
participation fee at the end of the session. After subjects consented to participate in the 
auction, they were assigned an ID number and were asked to complete a survey requesting 
information on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as a question to 
measure participants’ level of competitiveness. We used a question commonly used in the 
psychology and marketing literature to assess competitiveness of individuals. In particular, 
we used a question with the following four items developed by Helmreich and Spence 
(1978) and applied by Brown and Peterson (1994), Brown, Cron and Slocum (1998) and, 
Mowen (2004): i) I enjoy competition more than others; ii) I feel that it is important to 
outperform others; iii) I enjoy testing my abilities against others; iv) I feel that winning is 
extremely important. Respondents were asked to give their degree of agreement with these 
four sentences in a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 5 
indicates strong agreement. After the completion of the questionnaire, the monitor, in the 
second treatment, checked the competitiveness question and around four participants with 
the highest levels of competitiveness were not allowed to participate in the session. They 
received the 10 € participation fees and thanks for their participation. Then, all the 
participants remaining in the sessions received the experimental instructions together with 
the product information. The monitor then read the instructions aloud emphasizing that 
their dominant strategy is to reveal their true values and that one round and one product will 
be randomly drawn as binding. They were also asked not to communicate with any other 
participant for any reason, because any attempt to communicate with each other would lead 
                                                                                                                                                    
the literature, we opted to use multiple rounds with price feedback based on the premise that it could enhance the learning 
effect.  
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to the failure of the experiment. Moreover, the monitor encouraged the participants to ask 
questions about the auction procedure if they have some doubts. We then ran a practice 
auction using four different candy bars to fully familiarize participants with the auction 
mechanism and to instruct them that it is in their best interest to bid their true values. After 
the practice auction with the candy bars, we conducted the lamb meat auction. First, the 
monitor passed the packages of lamb ribs to be auctioned around so that each participant 
could inspect the products. Then, the lamb auction was conducted in several steps:   
Step 1. Subjects were asked to simultaneously submit a bid for each of the four lamb meat 
packages. The bids were collected and ranked from highest to lowest and the ID number of 
the top three bidders and the 4th highest price for each of the products were posted on the 
board.  
Step 2. Step 1 was repeated for four additional rounds.  
Step 3. After all the rounds were conducted, a random drawing determined which of the 
five rounds was binding. 
Step 4. A random drawing determined which of the four lamb meat packages was binding. 
Step 5.  The top three bidders on the binding product in the binding round had to purchase 
the lamb meat package and paid a price equivalent to the 4th highest bid for the product.  
 
3. Results 
 
Third and fourth columns in Table 1 report the descriptive statistics of the socio-
demographic variables for treatment 1 and treatment 2. A total of 78 subjects participated in 
treatment 1, whereas a total of 54 subjects participated in treatment 2. We used the Kruskal-
Wallis test to determine if there are significant differences in socio-demographic variables 
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across the two treatments. The results of the tests suggest that there are no statistically 
significant differences at the 5% level across treatments by gender (p-value = 0.99), 
household size (p-value=0.26), education (p-value = 0.92) and income (p-value = 0.93). 
Then, the socio-demographic characteristics for both samples are similar.    
 
[Include table 1 here] 
 
The mean bids for the four lamb meat products by rounds for treatments 1 and 2 are 
exhibited in Table 2 as well as the competitiveness index5. Our null hypothesis (H0: BidsC = 
BidsLC ; H1: BidsC ≠ BidsLC) is not rejected for all the rounds and the four products, then 
participants bids from both treatments are statistically equal. Moreover, as expected, the 
level of participant competitiveness is statistically higher in treatment 1 than in treatment 2. 
Results from these two tests indicated that the level of participants’ competitiveness does 
not affect their bidding behavior because although the level of competitiveness is different 
(higher in the first treatment) across treatment, participants bids for the products are the 
same.  
[Include table 2 here] 
 
Nevertheless, to test our hypothesis after controlling for differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics and taking into account the panel nature of our data we modelled the elicited 
bids for the four lamb meat products as a function of socio-demographic variables, rounds 
                                                 
5 The cronbach’ alpha coefficient for the competitiveness question was 0.8 similar to the one found by 
Brown et al., (1998) and higher than the recommended level of 0.7. Using the scores given to the four 
sentences, we calculated a competitiveness index for each participant as the sum of each subject’s responses 
to the 4 sentences. Hence, the competitiveness index is from 4 to 20. 
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and a Treatment2 dummy variable that takes value 1 if subjects participated in treatment 2 
and 0 otherwise. The model specification is as follows:   
 
(2) itiiit TreatmentroundroundroundroundBXBids    254433221  
 
where Bidsit is the bid for the ith consumer in the tth bidding round, Xi is a vector of 
demographic control variables (defined in table 1) and round2, round3, round4 and round5 
are dummy variables for the different rounds.  
We estimated the model defined by equation (2) using a random-effects to take into 
account individuals’ heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2003). Estimated coefficients using the 
STATA are presented in Table 3. The dummy variables for the rounds are positive and 
mostly statistically significant. However, the estimated coefficients suggest that round 
effects are not monotonically increasing across rounds, ceteris paribus, but fluctuating 
around the mean which implies that there are minimal bid affiliation effects. 
 To test our hypothesis (H0: BidsC = BidsLC ; H1: BidsC ≠ BidsLC), we used the t-ratio 
of the treatment 2 variable. Because the estimated parameter for the treatment 2 variable is 
not statistically significant for the four analyzed products we can conclude that bids for the 
two treatments are the same, corroborating our previous results using the Kruskal-Wallis 
test (Table 2).  
[Include table 3 here] 
Hence, our findings generally indicate that the level of participants’ competitiveness 
does not affect bidding behavior for the four lamb meat products and then, experimental 
auctions are able to reveal the true preferences regardless of the level of participants’ 
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competitiveness. In other words, if we use an incentive compatible mechanism in 
homegrown auctions and we instruct participants that it is in their best interest to offer a bid 
equal to their true value, the experimental auction will be demand revealing regardless the 
level of participants’ competitiveness.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The increasing popularity of the experimental auctions to value new products or 
attributes is due to their theoretical economic incentive compatibility property. However, 
the effectiveness of the incentive compatibility property of the auction depends on several 
key assumptions. It is argued that results from homegrown experimental auctions are 
sometimes not demand revealing because of different reasons. In this paper we were 
interested in one of the factors that could change participants bidding behavior in the 
auctions, the level of competitiveness. Assuming that participants with higher level of 
competitiveness may offer higher bids because they gain additional utility from winning the 
auction, we were interested in checking if the level of participants’ competitiveness does 
affect their bidding behavior which might compromise the empirical demand revealing 
property of the auction. To date no experiment has been specifically designed to examine 
this issue.  
Our experiment consisted of two treatments with all the same designed 
characteristics except that in the second treatment, participants who reported higher levels 
of competitiveness were not allow to participate in the auction. Then, we can directly 
compare bids from both treatments to test differences in bidding behavior between them. 
Our results showed that bids from both treatments (higher competitiveness and lower 
competitiveness) are statistically similar. Then, our key finding is that the level of 
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participants’ competitiveness does not affect bidding behavior and then, homegrown 
experimental auctions are able to reveal the true preferences regardless of the level of 
participants’ competitiveness. Our contribution to the literature and to the practitioners 
working with experimental auctions is that, if we use a theoretical economic incentive 
compatible mechanism in homegrown auctions and make sure that participants are instruct 
that it is in their best interest to offer a bid equal to their true, then the experimental auction 
will be demand revealing in practice regardless the level of participants’ competitiveness.  
One possible criticism of our study is that we used a self-reported measure of 
participants competitiveness and further research is still needed using some objective 
indicator. However, the question used had been also applied in several empirical papers and 
the validity of the competitiveness scale in our case was high.  
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Table 1. Definition and Means of Demographic Variables 
Variable definition Name (type) Treatment  1 Treatment 2 Testa 
Number of participants  78 54  
Gender 
  Male 
  Female  
 
FEMALE (dummy 
1=female; 0 otherwise) 
 
 
29.5 
70.5 
 
29.6 
70.4 
 
0.000 
(0.988) 
Age (years) 
    
YEARS (continuous)  
 
53.9 
 
47.1 
 
6.742 
(0.009)** 
Household size  
HSIZE (continuous) 
 
3.1 
 
2.8 
 
1.254 
(0.262) 
Education of respondent  
  High School  
    
HIGHSCHOOL (dummy 
1=high school; 0 otherwise) 
 
26.9 
 
25.9 
 
0.009 
(0.92) 
Income 
  High income 
   HINCOME (dummy 1=more 
than 2,500 €;  
0 otherwise) 
 
 
26.9 
 
 
27.8 
 
 
0.007 
(0.93) 
athe Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test was calculated. 
* and ** denote statistically significant differences at  10% and 5%, respectively 
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Table 2. Mean bids for each lamb meat product in treatment 1 and treatment 2 by rounds 
and mean competitiveness index 
 Bids Competitiveness 
Index  
 Round1 Round2 Round3 Round4 Round5 Mean Mean 
Lamb 
Treatment1 2.11 2.18 2.18 2.15 2.21 2.17 11.12 
Treatment2 2.03 2.15 2.18 2.25 2.31 2.18 9.65 
Test (χ2, p-
value)a 
0.024 
(0.88) 
0.102 
(0.75) 
0.085 
(0.77) 
0.091 
(0.76) 
0.199 
(0.65) 
0.028 
(0.87) 
5.95 
(0.01)** 
Suckling lamb 
Treatment1 2.71 2.85 2.78 2.78 2.86 2.80 11.12 
Treatment2 2.61 2.83 2.77 2.73 2.83 2.75 9.65 
Test (χ2, p-
value)a 
0.187 
(0.66) 
0.199 
(0.65) 
0.054 
(0.82) 
0.022 
(0.88) 
0.058 
(0.81) 
0.002 
(0.96) 
5.95 
(0.01)** 
Lamb labeled as “Ojinegra from Teruel” 
Treatment1 2.49 2.68 2.60 2.69 2.71 2.63 11.12 
Treatment2 2.40 2.55 2.56 2.56 2.60 2.53 9.65 
Test (χ2, p-
value)a 
0.248 
(0.62) 
0.015 
(0.90) 
0.004 
(0.95) 
0.130 
(0.72) 
0.009 
(0.93) 
0.114 
(0.73) 
5.95 
(0.01)** 
Suckling lamb labeled as “Ojinegra from Teruel” 
Treatment1 2.94 3.13 3.07 3.10 3.14 3.08 11.12 
Treatment2 2.97 3.18 3.05 3.05 3.11 3.07 9.65 
Test (χ2, p-
value)a 
0.000 
(0.98) 
0.482 
(0.48) 
0.155 
(0.69) 
0.043 
(0.83) 
0.164 
(0.68) 
0.232 
(0.63) 
5.95 
(0.01)** 
athe Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test was calculated. 
* and ** denote statistically significant differences at  10% and 5%, respectively 
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Table 3. Random-effect models for the four lamb meat products 
Variables Lamb Suckling lamb Labeled lamb Labeled suckling  
Constant 2.0244 
(4.25)** 
2.1020 
(3.44)** 
2.6548 
(4.68)** 
2.1856 
(3.27)** 
Female  0.4999 
(3.08)** 
0.8805 
(4.13)** 
0.6828 
(3.84)** 
0.9722 
(4.15)** 
Age -0.0028 
(-0.50) 
0.0008 
(0.11) 
-0.0088 
(-1.30) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
Hsize -0.0700 
(-1.06) 
-0.0604 
(-0.66) 
-0.0532 
(-0.64) 
0.0018 
(0.02) 
Highschool -0.0015 
(-0.01) 
-0.0101 
(-0.05) 
-0.1074 
(-0.51) 
-0.0262 
(-0.10) 
Hincome 0.2279 
(1.13) 
0.4121 
(1.62)* 
0.1005 
(0.49) 
0.3018 
(1.12) 
Round 2 0.0870 
(1.75)* 
0.1697 
(2.39)** 
0.1735 
(2.87)** 
0.1996 
(2.58)** 
Round 3 0.0995 
(2.05)** 
0.1048 
(1.54)* 
0.1312 
(2.21)** 
0.1122 
(2.58)** 
Round 4 0.1156 
(2.26)** 
0.0905 
(1.25) 
0.1839 
(2.96)** 
0.1293 
(1.76)** 
Round 5 0.1746 
(3.30)** 
0.1807 
(2.45)** 
0.2155 
(3.25)** 
0.1748 
(2.26)** 
Treatment 2 -0.0223 
(-0.14) 
-0.0562 
(-0.25) 
-0.1735 
(-0.90) 
-0.0110 
(-0.04) 
N 660 660 660 660 
χ2 
 p-value 
28.9 
(0.00)** 
31.82 
(0.00)** 
38.53 
(0.00)** 
30.7 
(0.00)** 
* and ** denote statistically significant differences at  10% and 5%, respectively 
z-ratios are in parenthesis, unless stated  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
